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To guide risk assessment, expected numbers of cases 
and generations were estimated, assuming a case 
importation of Middle East respiratory syndrome 
(MERS). Our analysis of 36 importation events yielded 
the risk of observing secondary transmission events at 
22.7% (95% confidence interval: 19.3–25.1). The risks 
of observing generations 2, 3 and 4 were estimated at 
10.5%, 6.1% and 3.9%, respectively. Countries at risk 
should be ready for highly variable outcomes follow-
ing an importation of MERS.
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) has con-
tinued to spread globally [1]. A large cluster of MERS 
cases has been observed in the Republic of Korea since 
May 2015 [2]. Until 1 July 2015, so-called quaternary 
cases (i.e. generation 3 counting from the index case 
as generation 0) have been reported in South Korea 
[2]. Although the inter-human transmission potential of 
MERS is considered to be too low to cause large-scale 
epidemics [3-5], high variability and heterogeneity in 
the transmission potential have been underscored [6]. 
As MERS continues to spread globally, it is vital that 
risk assessment involves an evaluation of the poten-
tial outcomes following MERS importation events [7]. 
Among a total of 23 importation events in countries 
outside the Middle East region, there have been four 
MERS case importations that have given rise to at least 
one secondary transmission event [2].
While the basic reproduction number R0, i.e. the aver-
age number of secondary cases produced by a primary 
case in a fully susceptible population, is less than 1 for 
MERS and a major epidemic may therefore not occur 
immediately, it is critical to quantitatively assess sev-
eral risks of MERS transmission following an importa-
tion event, e.g. the expected numbers of cases and 
generations. The present study aims to analyse the 
observed importation events of MERS and estimate the 
expected size of MERS clusters and the number of gen-
erations using a stochastic epidemic model.
Importation data
Using secondary data sources [2,7-11], we extracted 
the numbers of secondary cases and generations for 
each reported importation event of MERS. We excluded 
data from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates from the analysis because cases 
in these endemic countries have frequently experi-
enced exposures to a domestic animal reservoir (e.g. 
dromedary camels). Moreover, it has not been possi-
ble to fully track the transmission trees (i.e. via contact 
tracing data) in these countries. Including Middle East 
countries other than those, a total of 36 importation 
events were analysed. Of these, 13 events occurred 
in the Middle East, reported from Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Turkey and Yemen. In the pre-
sent study, statistical estimation of parameters was 
done using two different sets of data, i.e. using all 36 
importation events and restricting the analysis to the 
23 importation events observed in areas outside of the 
Middle East. The latter data were analysed separately 
because the dynamics of case importation including 
the frequency of exposures and local contact patterns 
for those 23 events may not be fully comparable with 
the remaining 13 events.
Mathematical model
The importation event data were analysed using a 
branching process model which allowed us to jointly 
estimate the transmissibility, R0, and the dispersion 
parameter, k, by assuming that the distribution of 
secondary cases per single primary case followed a 
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negative binomial distribution. Using the branching 
process model, the risk of observing at least one sec-
ondary transmission event, the risk of observing each 
generation of cases and the total number of cases were 
estimated. Hence, an important assumption to calcu-
late these risks based on observed importation event 
data is that each importation event was a random sam-
ple drawn from the assumed model. For the estimation 
of the two model parameters, we used two different 
pieces of likelihood. The first one analyses the distri-
bution of the total number of cases as described by 
Breban et al. for MERS [4], but the present study spe-
cifically focused on importation events [12]. Given the 
total number of cases z for each importation event, the 
likelihood to estimate R0 and k was calculated as
The number of observed importation events was lim-
ited to 36 and the sample size was small. To reduce 
uncertainty, we analysed in addition the number of 
generations per importation. Considering the concept 
of generation to extinction, we derived the probability 
distribution of the number of generations, i.e.
from which we obtained the likelihood function L2 for 
the observed number of generations, derived from 
Pr(g ≤ h)-Pr(g ≤ h-1) for h > 1, i.e.
and so forth. The total likelihood was given by the 
product of L1 and L2. The maximum likelihood method 
was employed to statistically infer the parameters, and 
the profile likelihood-based confidence intervals (CI) 
were computed. To account for both stochasticity and 
parameter uncertainty in calculating the outbreak size 
distribution and the risk of observing each generation 
of cases, the covariance matrix was used to draw ran-
dom samples of R0 and k from a bivariate normal distri-
bution with the correlation parameter informed by the 
matrix. The simulations were run 10,000 times, allow-
ing us to take percentile points for the calculation of 
uncertainty bounds.
Results
Figure 1 illustrates the original data employed to quan-
tify our model.
The distribution of the total number of cases was right 
skewed, including two outbreaks with a total of at 
least eight cases. Excluding the Middle East countries, 
only the ongoing South Korean outbreak was the one 
that involved eight or more cases. With regard to the 
number of generations, three quarters of the impor-
tations (27/36) did not result in any secondary trans-
mission. Secondary transmissions were observed in 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, France, Republic of Korea, Oman 
(twice), Tunisia and the United Kingdom. Excluding 
Middle East countries, 19 of 23 importations did not 
generate any secondary cases (Table 1). Among the 
total of 36 importations, generation 3 (or the so-called 
quaternary cases) was observed only for the ongoing 
South Korean outbreak.
Table 2 shows the estimates of R0 and k. Based on 
a total of 36 events, R0 and k were estimated at 0.75 
(95% CI: 0.54–1.09) and 0.14 (95% CI: 0.06–0.32), 
respectively.
The value of k was substantially smaller than 1, indicat-
ing that the distribution of secondary cases per single 
primary case was highly over-dispersed. Analysing the 
23 importation events out of the Middle East coun-
tries, the estimates of R0 and k were 0.81 (95% CI: 
0.49–1.46) and 0.07 (95% CI: 0.02–0.21), respectively. 
These estimates were not significantly different from 
those obtained using the total set of 36 importation 
events. For this reason, simulations were conducted 
using estimates derived from the full set of 36 importa-
tion events.
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Figure 2 shows the expected total number of cases and 
the risk of observing each generation conditional on an 
importation event.
The risk of observing at least one secondary trans-
mission was 22.7% (95% CI: 19.3–25.1) (Figure 2A). 
The risks of observing generations 2, 3 and 4 were, 
respectively, 10.5%, 6.1% and 3.9% (Figure 2B). When 
generation 2 (tertiary cases) was observed, the con-
ditional risk of observing the next generation (quater-
nary cases) was as large as 63.6% (95% CI: 46.7–74.4) 
(Figure 2C). The outbreak size distribution appeared to 
be highly skewed (Figure 2D). Assuming an importation 
occurred, the risk of observing eight or more cases in 
total would be 10.9% (95% CI: 7.6–13.6).
Discussion
The present study analysed importation events of MERS 
with a particular focus on the associated outbreak size 
Figure 1
Importation events of Middle East respiratory syndrome 
(n = 36)
A. The observed number of importation events as a function of the 
total number of cases. An importation event frequently ends up 
with only the imported (index) case, i.e. without generating any 
secondary cases. 
B. Observed number of importation events by total number 
of generations observed for each importation. Generation 0 
represents the imported (index) case, generation 1 represents 
secondary cases produced by the imported case, and so forth.
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Table 1
Importation of Middle East respiratory syndrome to 
the 23 countries outside the Middle East that have 
experienced case until 1 July 2015 (n = 208 cases)
Country Generation Total number of cases
Algeria 0 1
Algeria 0 1
Austria 0 1
China 0 1
France 1 2
Germany 0 1
Germany 0 1
Germany 0 1
Germany 0 1
Greece 0 1
Italy 0 1
Malaysia 0 1
The Netherlands 0 1
The Netherlands 0 1
Philippines 0 1
Philippines 0 1
South Korea 3 181
Thailand 0 1
Tunisia 1 2
Tunisia 0 1
United Kingdom 1 4
United States 0 1
United States 0 1
The generation column represents the total number of generations 
(e.g. 0 indicates that the imported index case did not generate any 
secondary cases), while the total number of cases represents the 
cumulative number of confirmed cases including the index case 
(e.g. 1 indicates that the imported index case did not generate any 
secondary cases). For instance, in France, there was a secondary 
transmission, causing generation 1, but there was only 1 secondary 
case without tertiary case, and thus, the total number of cases was 
2. 
According to our classification, Turkey was included in the Middle 
East.
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and number of disease generations arising from each 
importation event. Our findings indicate that if a case 
of MERS was imported, at least one secondary trans-
mission event would be observed with a probability 
of 22.7%. The risk of involving tertiary, quaternary 
and quinary cases was also calculated (Figure 2B). 
Although our study only relied upon importation events 
consisting of a small number of clusters, the estimated 
R0 was broadly consistent with published estimates 
that analysed larger cluster datasets mainly observed 
in Middle East countries [3-5] and was smaller than 
estimates derived from the early phase of hospital-
associated outbreaks [13]. Considering that countries 
at risk of importation (i.e. countries without infected 
animal reservoirs) have had to confront the uncertainty 
associated with the risk of experiencing a case impor-
tation [14,15,16], our modelling analyses could facili-
tate quantitative risk assessment.
An important outcome of the present study is that the 
risk of observing multiple generations of MERS cases 
was estimated at 22.7% and that of a tertiary case at 
Figure 2
Probabilities of observing multiple generations of Middle East respiratory syndrome cases given one case importation
A. Frequency distribution of the probability of observing at least one secondary case caused by an imported (index) case, based on a total of 
10,000 simulation runs. 
B. Probability that the transmission survives to a specific generation given an imported (index) case. 
C. Conditional probability that the transmission goes extinct at the particular generation given case(s) in the corresponding generation. Until 
20 June 2015, cases of MERS up to generation 3 (i.e. or the so-called quaternary cases) have been diagnosed in South Korea. 
D. Frequency distribution of the total number of cases given an imported case. 
In panels B, C and D, filled circles represent the posterior median of simulations, while whiskers extend to upper and lower 95% credible 
intervals, based on 10,000 posterior resampling simulation runs.
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10.5% in our model. Since the distribution of secondary 
cases per single primary case is highly over-dispersed, 
superspreading events can occur, and thus, the 
expected total number of cases is highly variable. The 
finding echoes a recent re-analysis of clusters of MERS 
cases reported up to August 2013 [17]. Of course, we 
can expect that secondary transmission events could 
be prevented by a combination of contact tracing, mon-
itoring suspected cases, early diagnosis and isolation 
of infectious individuals. Besides, the present study 
suggests that countries at risk of importation should 
keep in mind that a large cluster of cases with multiple 
generations may well occur, even though R0 is clearly 
below the epidemic threshold at 1.0 [18].
In addition to the risk of observing a certain number of 
generations following an imported case, we also calcu-
lated the conditional risk of observing the next genera-
tion of case(s). This is in line with a risk assessment 
in real time: because the exact number of cases in a 
single generation cannot be manually counted during 
the course of an outbreak, it is reasonable to calculate 
the conditional risk given a generation where the con-
ditional probability of observing the next generation is 
usually greater than 50%.
Two important limitations should be noted. Firstly, our 
exercise regarded each observed importation event as 
a random draw governed by the proposed probability 
model. Indeed, this assumption is unavoidable for fit-
ting a branching process model to the data [3,4]. While 
the assumption may be common among modelling 
studies, it did not allow us to account for the variable 
type and effectiveness of interventions, especially at 
later generations of cases in each cluster. Secondly, 
MERS outbreaks have frequently been amplified in 
healthcare settings [6,19,20], but we limited ourselves 
to accounting for individual heterogeneity in a general 
sense. An improvement on this point was difficult, 
because MERS outbreaks have been seen mostly in 
healthcare settings without large-scale community 
transmission. The transmission dynamics in and out of 
healthcare settings have not been consistently charac-
terised across individual outbreaks of MERS.
Despite these limitations, the present study success-
fully characterised the risk of observing a certain num-
ber of cases and generations given a case importation 
of MERS. The risk of at least one secondary case in 
our model was 22.7%, and that of a tertiary case was 
10.5%. Once an untraced case is imported, countries 
at risk should assume that the secondary transmission 
risk as well as the risk of observing multiple genera-
tions of cases exists and should be ready to respond 
effectively by following their preparedness plans to 
manage emerging infectious diseases.
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